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ABSTRACT:  This paper investigates the role performed by mothers in affecting their 
childrens’ performance at school. The article develops firstly a theoretical model in which 
household (parent - child pair) is treated as an individual, whose utility depends both on the 
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possibilities through which help of mothers may affect pupil’s performance both in terms of 
time devoted to supervision and spillover effects. Empirical evidence then, using PISA 2006 
and focusing on Italian case, shows that education of mothers is an issue when interacted with 
her occupational status. Highly educated mothers have a positive impact on students’ score 
only when they are highly qualifed in the job market. 
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1 Introduction
Achievement is a multidimensional concept. An individual may remain poor
but reach a respected position in the community he lives in, or he may earn a
high income in an ill-famed profession, have a good school or army record,
or again he simply may succeed in living up to his/her standards, whatever
they are. In this paper we discuss a particularly important type of achieve-
ment, namely school achievement , and the relationship between childrens
achievement and their parentseducation level As Haveman and Wolfe (1995)
put it:
"(...) perhaps the most fundamental factor [among those inuencing childs
educational attainment] is the human capital of parents, typically measured by
the number of school years attained. This variable (...) is included in virtu-
ally every study described [in their paper] (...);it is statistically signicant and
quantitatively important, no matter how it is dened."
In this paper we do not challenge this conclusion, but try to look in more
depth into it. The question is, as the title of the paper says, why is parentsed-
ucation so important in children performance. We begin by concisely reviewing
two issues related to the inuence of the family on children performance, while
the third one lies at the core of the paper.
The rst issue is the well known "nature or nurture ?" question. Parents
pass on to their children their genetic endowment. To the extent that school
achievement depends on genetic factors, there might be no genuine causal re-
lationship running from parentsto childrens school achievements, both being
explained by the common genetic endowment. The idea that "genetics explains
all", has far-reaching implications for the very conception of equality among
human beings and for public policies pursuing such equality.This explains why
this issue has been the subject of recurring harsh public debates (see for in-
stance Jensen (1969), Kamin (1974), Herrnstein-Murray (1994)) . The typical
methods of behavioural genetics (i.e. studies on twins and adoptees) have been
used not only by genetists but also by scholars with a social and economic ori-
entation (see Bound-Solon (1999), Holmlund, et al. (2008) and Pronzato
(2008) for comparison among methods). As a whole, it seems that although
genetic factors are non-negligible, they account for a partial share of the indi-
viduals performance (see for instance Thompson et al.(1991) and DeFries et
al. (2001)).
Once the relative weights of nature and nurture are established, much re-
mains to be said about what "nurture" is and how it works. The next important
question regards the relative weights of family- versus non-family inuences.
Even in disciplines usually very keen on within-family e¤ects, like develop-
mental psychology, the issue of non-family e¤ects emerges (see for instance the
heathed debate stimulated in the psychologistseld by Harris(1998)). On the
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other hand, even if one is willing to stress the inuences coming from the so-
cial environment at large, neverthless one would agree that such inuences are
possibly mediated by the family environment (see also Patacchini-Zenou (2004)
for a choice-based approach to the issue). Almost all recent studies based on
the OECD -PISA database (see in particular Fertig-Schmidt (2002) , Fertig
(2003), Bratti et. al. (2007), Sprietsma (2006), Fuchs and Woessman (2004) ,
Ammermullaer (2004)) include and emphasize background variables like terri-
torial factors or the immigrant condition as explanatory variables. In this
paper too a wide array of these background variables is taken into account.
The third important question is the nature of within-family inuences. As
economists, we are particularly interested in distinguishing between inuences
which require a specic allocation of resources and those which do not (see
Becker and Tomes (1986) for an early contribution). Day-by-day interaction
within the family inuences per se the performance of children : just think
of how transmission of ethical values, through moral suasion or personal
example may induce or not children to put e¤ort into studying; of how critical
events such as death or divorce or long-term factors like the number of siblings
can a¤ect the school performance of children (Woessman (2003)). Notice also
that, in these examples, the inuence is in principle independent of the
parentshuman capital and, always in general, it may not require any specic
allocation of time or other resources to the task. In other cases it is still
true that no time/resource allocation is needed for the inuence to take place,
but human capital may instead be required. This happens with within-family
knowledge spillovers: the simplest example is how children may learn a correct
and sophisticated use of language by everyday exchanges with correctly speaking
parents.
There are, nally, forms of inuence of parents on the school achievement of
children which require time . These include on the one hand supervision activ-
ities, which per se are independent of parentshuman capital (like for instance
controlling that children do their homework or regularly meeting teachers); on
the other hand there are assistance activities which require both time and
human capital (for instance, helping children when studying) .
Which of the inuences described is more or less relevant to childs school
performance is an issue of some policy import. Were supervision time the sole
factor inuencing school performance, increasing the level of education of par-
ents would be not benecial (on this particular respect) , since it would increase
the opportunity cost of time for parents and reduce their propensity to spend
time in supervising children. If instead knowledge spillovers were the key factor,
the conclusion would be the reverse one. Then understanding why is parents
education important may help in designing long-term education policies. There
is a rather sensitive point to be made here. In this paragraph and in the model
of the next one, we speak of "parent" and "parents" without any specication
of gender; all we say applies in principle to mothers and fathers alike. The
economics of education literature is however rather keen on this kind of distinc-
tion . (some recent contributions are Holmlund et al. (2008), Pronzato (2008),
Behrman et al. (1997), Andrabi et al. (2009)). There are good reasons for this
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interest. The main one is that any notion of development meaning more than
GDP growth, includes improving women education levels as a critical goal; then
the e¤ects of women education vìs-a-vìs male education become crucial. The
other one is that that women and men play di¤erent roles within family.The na-
ture and the strength of social and cultural background determines what such
roles are and how strict or interchangeable thay are; to the extent that di¤erent
roles are systematically played, the same education level in mother and father
might have di¤erential impact on the children performance. As we shall see
later, our data seem to conrm that the impact of mothers education is more
complex than that of fathers. However we do not o¤er explanations of this
di¤erence. We simply take it as given and discuss at some length the evdience
concerning mothers education.
In this paper we model the parentschoice about the allocation of time be-
tween labour and children "guidance", which includes both supervision (guid-
ance time whose e¤ectiveness is independent of parents education ) and as-
sistance (guidance time whose e¤ectiveness might in principle be sensitive to
parentseducation). Parents are characterized by a level of education and by
an occupational status, which are observable, and by an underlying unobserved
characteristic (parentsquality) which is related to education and to the occu-
pational status in a non-deterministic way. (Section 2). The model provides an
interpretative framework for some of the results we obtain in Section 3. Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 A model of parental support
Let us consider the household (the parent-child pair) as an individual agent
whose utility depends on s (the school achievement of the child,as measured
by the test score), and on consumption c. Suppose that the household then
maximizes the following utility function
max u (c; s) =
c1 
1   + s
c (1)
This functional form allows for a decreasing marginal utility of consumption
and for some complementarity between consumption and childs performance.
Parents are characterized by two parameters: one, discrete and observable e, the
education attainment, which takes values e0 < e1 < e2. The other, continuous
and unobservable, q corresponds to the "quality" of the individual. This is
related to education, in the sense that for e = ei (i = 0; 1; 2), the quality q of
an individual with ei is q = ei+ , where  is a random variable with mean 0.
Then, if ei > ej :
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prob fq  bq; eig = 1  F (bq   ei) > 1  F (bq   ej) = prob fq  bq; ejg
where F (:) is the distribution function of . The parent owns a time
endowment T which he/she can employ in the labour market, earning a
wage w (q), or in supervising the child in studying. w (q) is a Mincer
function with w0 (q) > 0. If we denote as h the time devoted to supervision,
the budget constraint is
c = w (q) (T   h)
School achievement s depends on h through the following education pro-
duction function (Hanushek (2008))
s = kh+ b (q) (2)
b(q) is a continuous increasing function of q, while k depends on q in the
following way
k(q) =
kH if q > q0
kL if q  q0
for some threshold q0, with kH > kL We therefore assume that the ability
of a parent in assisting the children changes with the parents quality level,
but in a discrete way and only at relatively low levels of education. Then the
parents quality a¤ects children performance both directly (b (q)) and through
a higher e¢ ciency in the use of time devoted to children assistance.
Now let us consider an individual with a given quality level q > q0:After
suitable substitutions, the objective function becomes:
' (h; q) =
[w (q) (T   h)]1 
1   + (kh+ b (q))

[w (q) (T   h)] (3)
where k = kH . The necessary condition for an internal solution is
'h (h; q) =  w (q)1  (T   h)  +
(kh+ b (q))

w (q)

(T   h)
n
k (kh+ b (q))
 1    (T   h) 1
o
= 0
(4)
Hence:
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(kh+ b (q))

=
w (q)
1  
(T   h)  
k (kh+ b (q))
 1    (T   h) 1 (5)
For su¢ ciently small changes in q; the full impact on the test score s is given
by:
ds
dq
= k(q)
dh
dq
+ bq (6)
The full expression for dhdq is
dh
dq =  
'hq
'hh
, where 'hh < 0; therefore, as q
increases (by su¢ ciently small amounts), h changes according to the sign of
the following expression
'hq (h; q) = (   1 + )w (q)1  (T   h)  wqw(q)+
+
h
( 1)k(kh+b(q)) 1 (T h) 1
k(kh+b(q)) 1 (T h) 1
i
w (q)
1 
(T   h)  (kh+ b (q)) 1 bq
(7)
Equation (7)summarizes the two components of the impact of q on h.
In the absence of a direct e¤ect (bq = 0), the sign of 'hq depends on
(   1 + ) : If there is no complementarity between consumption an school
achievement ( = 0) it is still possible that an increase in e increases the
amount of family support (a rapidly declining marginal utility of consumption
is required, i.e.  > 1): The sign of the second term is also ambiguous. If
 < 1; it is certainly negative: a higher value of q increases the direct spillovers,
so that the parent can reduce the time devoted to children assistance. By means
of some tedious calculations, however, it can be shown that the term
1
'hh
n
'hh  
h
( 1)k(kh+b(q)) 1 (T h) 1
k(kh+b(q)) 1 (T h) 1
i
w (q)
1 
(T   h)  (kh+ b (q)) 1
o
which represents the overall contribution of the term bq to the variation of
s , is always positive.
Suppose on the other hand that q changes from some initial level q < q0 to
q +q > q0, where q is nite. Then we have the following change in the test
score
s
q
= kL
h
 
q +q
  h  q
q
+
b
 
q +q
  b  q
q
+ (kH   kL)
h
 
q +q

q
(8)
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While the rst and the second term in (8) are the discrete counterparts of
the two terms of (6), the term (kH   kL) h(q+q)q , unambiguously positive,
appears only in this discrete case. Now, if we compare two parents,A and B
with education levels respectively e0 and e2; the probability that qA < q0 and
qB > q0 is: F (q0   e0) [1  F (q0   e2)], while if we compare parents C and B ,
where the education level of C is e1; the probability that qC < q0 and qB > q0 is
F (q0   e1) [1  F (q0   e2)]. This means that we are more likely to observe the
e¤ect described by the term (kH   kL) h(q+q)q when we compare a low level of
education with higher levels, rather than when comparing levels both relatively
high.
Unfortunately, we do not observe h nor q, but only e and y, the occupational
status of the parent. The occupational status (ybl=blue collar-low qualied,
ybh=blue collar-high qualied,ywl=white collar-low qualied, ywh=white collar-
high qualied, u = unemployed) is assumed to signal, however imperfectly, both
the quality of the parent and the use of time he/she makes.More precisely we
assume:
prob fywh; e; q  bqg = prob fe; q  bq; ywhg prob fywhg
prob fe; q  bqg > prob fywh; eg =
prob fe; ywhg prob fywhg
prob feg , i.e.
prob fe; q  bq; ywhg
prob fe; q  bqg > prob fe; ywhgprob feg (9)
This assumption simply means that the probability of an individual getting
a high qualied, white collar job is higher if he/she has a given level of education
and he/she is of high quality, than in the case he/she simply has that level of
education. Notice that since by denition:
prob fe; q  bq; ywhg = prob fe; q  bq; ywhg
prob fywhg and prob fe; ywh; q  bqg = prob fe; q  bq; ywhgprob fq  bqg
we have
prob fe; q  bq; ywhg prob fywhg
prob fq  bqg = prob fe; ywh; q  bqg (10)
We can easily prove the following lemma
Lemma 1 Under assumption (9) : prob fq  bq; e; ywhg > prob fq  bq; eg
prob fq  bq; e; ywhg = prob fe; ywh; q  bqg prob fq  bqg
prob fe; ywhg > prob fq  bq; eg =
prob fe; q  bqg prob fq  bqg
prob feg that is:
prob fe; ywh; q  bqg
prob fe; ywhg >
prob fe; q  bqg
prob feg
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Proof. By assumption:
prob fe; q  bq; ywhg
prob fe; q  bqg > prob fe; ywhgprob feg . Substituting (10)
we get:
prob fe; ywh; q  bqg
prob fe; q  bqg prob fq  bqgprob fywhg > prob fe; ywhgprob feg
that is:
prob fe; ywh; q  bqg > prob fe; ywhg
prob feg prob fe; q  bqg
or:probfe;ywh;qbqgprobfe;ywhg > prob fe; q  bqgprob feg
According to our assumption, we should then expect that a high level of
education associated with a high qualied, white collar job is also associated
to a high quality level of the parent. Assuming that being unemployed signals
quality, i.e. that the probability of being unemployed is larger for low-quality
individuals, is certainly too rash; on the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume
that being unemployed signals that the opportunity cost of parents time is
rather low, and therefore it should, ceteris paribus, lead to more assistance to
children.
3 Data and method
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an OECD sur-
vey for educational attainment which tests 15 year-old students in the subjects
of mathematics, science and reading prociency. We use the 2006 cross-section,
which includes data about the 24 OECD countries plus other 33 countries.
Along with test scores in reading, math and science, information is collected
about many characteristics in a studentsand in a school questionnaire1 .
The studentsquestionnaire contains information about family background,
socio-economic status in terms of ownership of durable goods, a specic focus
on science2 issues.
The schools questionnaire contains information about number of students
enrolled, number of teachers part-time and full-time employed, quality of in-
frastructure, type of funds which the school receives (public or private).
For a detailed description of PISA dataset, see OECD (2006).
Looking at data used for this analysis, the Italian sample consists of 21773
students and 799 schools.
Italy is one of the worst achievers among industrialised countries in terms of
PISA scores. OECD 2006 is no exception. In this paragraph, the distributions
1A parents questionnaire is available for some of the countries containing information
about parentsperception of studentsachievement, but we do not use this data
2 Its the reference theme for 2006
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of test scores for Italy is presented. Non-parametric kernel density estimates
describe the score distribution of the country.
Figure 1 displays the test score distributions for reading and math tests in
the case of Italy (ITA). In the next few sections we proceed to econometric
analysis. The average reading score is 486 points, while for math the average
score is 482 points.
Figure 1
In order to perform our econometric analysis, we divide the scores into 3
quantiles, dened at 0.15, 0.50 and 0.85. The assumption behind this choice
is that we can discriminate three levels of students: low performing, average
students and high performing students.
We then run quantile regressions to catch the e¤ects of a specied set of
regressors on the performance of students in di¤erent parts of the distribution,
testing di¤erent dependent variables: score in math; overall average score3 ; the
overall average score relative to school of attendance.
The set of controls does include: age and gender of student; his/her migration
status4 ; a variable saying if pupils speak a di¤erent language from that of the
schools country; schools type5 , schools region6 , education of both mother and
3Aritmetic mean of math, reading and science tests.
4We consider as migrants the students who were born in a di¤erent country from that of
the school they attend
5Lyceum or technical institute
6The variables says if the school is in the North or in the South of Italy
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father7 ; occupational status of both mother and father8 , a composite index for
socio-economic status at family level ; the number of books owned at home9 , the
lack of qualied math teachers; city size10 ; the presence of other school of the
same type in the neighbourhood; availability of computers at school; a variable
saying if the students studies at home; a variable saying if the students takes
out of school lectures.
Education is treated as a set of dummy variables saying if the parent has
low education, a high school diploma or a degree.
The database contains some information about employment status of par-
ents, although not as detailed as we perhaps would like. Since we know if
working parents are white or blue collars, high or low qualied, we assume that
individuals who are not classied neither as blue- nor white collars but that
are registered in the dataset are not working.
Finally, we introduce an interaction term containing the educational level
variable and the indicator of the occupational status.
4 Estimation Results
If we look at variables other than parent related ones, we nd a number
of standard result, along with some less conventional suggestions. A general
feature is that many coe¢ cients become smaller in absolute value as we consider
higher quantiles. The likely meaning of this feature is that adverse factors
are compensated for by increasing students talent, while favorable inuences
become less and less crucial to the nal performance. Unsurprising results are
obtained as regards the schools type, the region and the non-native condition:
attending a technical school11 , living in the southern regions and being a non-
native entail lower scores. More precisely, students of lyceums get on average
45 points more than student of technical schools. Students in the north of Italy
get on average 30 points more than students in the south. Being a non native
student determines a 20-25 lower scores than that of native students.
Two less conventional results are:
a) the coe¢ cient for spoken language at home is positive, which means that
per se speaking a foreign language constitutes an asset (while, as we have seen,
being an immigrant is not).
b) Males perform on average better than females in math (which is a
commonly found result): however, the coe¢ cient is increasing with the quantile
considered, a phenomenon for which an explanation is needed.
7Edum and Eduf in the results
8Msecateg and Fsecateg in the results
9The variable is a dummy with di¤erent categories, going from 0 to more than 500 books
10village with less than 3000 people; small town (between 3000 and 15000 people); town
(15000 up to 100000 people); city (100000 up to 1milion people); large city (more than 1
milion people)
11 Italian high school system is basically split into pre-university institutes, like classical and
scientic lyceums, and more technical and professional schools
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As regards parents education, the coe¢ cients referred to fathers contri-
bution are signicant and positive on average. The weight of the coe¢ cient is
rather small in comparison to that of the mother, with the expected sign.
As regards mothers, three main results are obtained
1. While holding a high school degree has a positive and signicant impact
on childs performance, the coe¢ cient associated to graduated mothers is
negative and signicant. In terms of the model, if we assume that there
exists a threshold q0 at which the mothers skill in assisting children when
studying increases to a highel level (kL to kH), we might interpret this
result by saying that the threshold is likely to be reached when the parent
earns a high school degree. This explains the strong observed e¤ect. When
the parent earns a university degree, kH does not increase anymore.
2. The fact that the mother works has a positive impact on the performance
of their child. If anything, this outcome signals that allocation of time to
children assistance or supervision is not the key factor for a good childs
performance.
3. When we control for the occupational status of mothers, the interaction
between being graduated and holding a high qualied job has a positive
impact on the performance of pupils, with higher impact for students with
a lower score. This is all the more signicant if we remind that holding
a university degree per se has a negative impact of childrens behaviour.
The e¤ect of being a high qualied white collar mother translates, on
average, into a 20 points higher score of the student.
We check the robustness of results by trying di¤erent dependent variables,
e.g. the math score and the relative score computed with respect to the school
average score. We also ran regressions clustered for school. These estimates
conrm the previously exposed results.
We also estimated the same models for di¤erent countries in PISA dataset:
namely, Sweden and Portugal. We followed here the work by Ammermueller
(2004) and Canova and Vaglio (2010). Sweden is a Scandinavian country which
we choose according to traditional development of welfare state of countries
within this area, while Portugal, besides very similar to Italy as regards the
distribution of the PISA scores, may also be considered similar to Italy with
respect of the general structure of the cultural context belonging to the Mediter-
renean model of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1996) .
Portugal yields a set of results very close to those concerning Italy, which
comforts us on the robustness of estimates. Swedish data instead produces
remarkably di¤erent outcomes. Since the Swedish socio-economic and cultural
context is commonly held to be completely di¤erent from the "Mediterranean"
model common to Italy and Portugal, it is reasonable to conjecture that these
social and economic context variables could be of some help in explaining the
peculiar features of mothers education.
Results of these regressions are presented in Appendix A.
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Table 1 -Quantile regressions: results for 0.15, 0.50, 0.85 quantiles: overall scores
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES q15 q50 q85
sex 2.341 10.52*** 14.23***
(1.904) (1.346) (2.315)
lyceum 59.83*** 53.06*** 42.80***
(1.172) (0.792) (0.820)
employed 89.02* 70.18*** 18.05
(48.24) (15.10) (15.37)
_Ieduf_2 11.03*** 8.567*** 12.37***
(1.712) (1.914) (1.930)
_Ieduf_3 -8.103*** -3.238 3.967**
(2.778) (2.470) (1.727)
_Iedum_2 8.843*** 13.23*** 9.953***
(1.594) (1.002) (2.447)
_Iedum_3 -25.01*** -17.99*** -12.48*
(6.593) (3.281) (6.950)
_Imsecateg_1 2.911 5.358** 4.719
(5.144) (2.163) (3.476)
_IeduXmse_2_1 -3.782 -5.562 -2.724
(7.201) (3.446) (3.034)
_IeduXmse_3_1 26.21** 22.90*** 19.20***
(10.63) (5.606) (4.747)
fsecateg 5.742*** 2.817 1.304
(1.404) (1.880) (3.186)
migrant_student -37.67*** -33.10*** -20.45***
(4.172) (3.897) (5.989)
_Iforeign_l_1 20.81*** 16.05*** 12.21***
(1.666) (1.978) (1.175)
escs 5.330*** 3.954** 0.517
(0.660) (1.548) (1.677)
_Inr_books_2 15.45*** 12.98*** 19.92***
(1.845) (3.244) (5.128)
_Inr_books_3 30.71*** 30.18*** 38.48***
(2.975) (1.858) (3.995)
_Inr_books_4 41.18*** 42.46*** 51.58***
(4.277) (3.009) (4.231)
_Inr_books_5 53.08*** 49.30*** 60.40***
(2.393) (2.815) (3.343)
_Inr_books_6 60.01*** 61.18*** 70.01***
(6.718) (4.173) (1.731)
no_sch_available -4.639* -6.022** 0.118
(2.558) (2.971) (2.645)
_Icity_size_2 15.92*** 21.02*** 18.13**
(5.160) (6.962) (8.401)
_Icity_size_3 29.80*** 34.42*** 25.38***
(4.677) (6.144) (7.698)
_Icity_size_4 35.01*** 40.29*** 33.66***
(4.785) (6.330) (5.127)
_Icity_size_5 27.82*** 36.05*** 21.63***
(9.669) (6.826) (7.209)
school_north 39.45*** 37.46*** 31.86***
(1.190) (1.783) (1.800)
study_out -45.58*** -47.23*** -50.61***
(2.988) (1.267) (3.075)
selfstudy 10.44*** 4.098* -0.593
(2.376) (2.094) (1.225)
Observations 15192 15192 15192
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* denote level of significance: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%
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5 Conclusions
Why is parentseducation so important? The general nding of this paper is
that parentseducation inuences children achievement through indirect chan-
nels rather than through relatively time-intensive channels. Motivation, knowl-
edge spillover, provision of a material and emotional environment enhancing
school performance seem therefore to be the driving factor. This is particularly
important if we think that these results refer to mothers education and use
of time (e.g. women access to the job market), which are two key issues in the
discussion over women role in the society: our results mean that an educated
and high qualied mother benets the school achievement of her children inde-
pendently, at least to some extent, of the time she devotes to direct supervision
and help. Were our conclusions conrmed by further research, then those insti-
tutional arrangements which enhance women education and participation to the
job market (and to the most qualied segments thereof), would receive further
support.
The policy relevance of such a conclusion is important in terms of design
of social policies aiming at helping mothers through childcare allowances or
other public transfer, which, at the same time, do not preclude job perspectives
of beneciaries. The relevance of the issue is striking for a country like Italy
which is traditionally considered an example of the familistic welfare state model
(Esping Andersen, 1990) and that experiences an overheated debate about the
possibility of reforming radically education system.
The main evidence seems to be that quantity of time devoted to education
of children is not a driving factor in having an impact on the performance of
students. Parents who have invested in human capital have a strong positive
impact on students scores and the quality of their job is relevant.Spill-over
e¤ects or personal example provided by parents is probably playing a role here
and must be take into consideration as an evidence that pupils educational
attainment is the multidimensional result of many factors, requiring therefore
targeted public interventions for each of them,
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